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ENERGY DEFERENCE 
 




lectricity law is complex, and the Supreme Court knows it. Lawyers 
are familiar with the adage that generalist courts tend to defer to 
agency decisions where the subject matter is complex or technical. But 
how exactly do deference regimes work in the presence of complexity? Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n (“EPSA”),1 
which the Supreme Court decided this spring, provides some insights. 
The case has garnered attention primarily for its jurisdictional implications. 
In fact, the jurisdictional question was the only one the parties presented to the 
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, in granting certiorari, the Court added a second 
question sua sponte: whether the price the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (“FERC”) set for demand response in wholesale markets was arbitrary 
and capricious. This essay will focus on that second, administrative law ques-
tion.  
Demand response is a service provided by end-use customers (residential, 
commercial, or industrial) in which they reduce their electricity usage in ex-
change for compensation. In a 2011 order, FERC required that demand 
response resources in wholesale markets be paid for their reductions at the same 
rate—called the “locational marginal price” (“LMP”) because it varies based on 
geography—as power generators are paid for their electricity.2 FERC’s domi-
nant justification for this choice was that demand response resources provide a 
value to the grid comparable to what generators provide.3 Essentially, both 
demand response resources and generators help to maintain the balance of 
supply and demand in wholesale electricity markets.4 This balance is vital to 
ensure reliable electricity service at a reasonable price. According to FERC, 
comparable contributions deserve comparable compensation. In response to 
concerns that the pricing scheme might result in higher wholesale prices in 
some circumstances, FERC included a safety valve: demand response resources 
																																																								
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.  
1 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
2 See Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 134 FERC ¶ 
61,187, para. 20 (2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35).  
3 Id. 
4 See id. para. 10. 
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would receive the LMP only where “cost-effective” as determined by a “net 
benefits” test that compared the cost of procuring the demand response with 
the savings from lower wholesale electricity prices.5 The Commission justified 
its entire scheme, in part, by reference to the conclusions of economist and 
regulatory scholar Alfred Kahn, whose expert declaration appears in the rule-
making record.6  
Electric power generators challenged the pricing scheme as arbitrary and 
capricious. Why? Demand response resources, so the argument goes, are 
already benefitting from not having to pay for the electricity they forgo. To pay 
them the full wholesale price would therefore compensate them twice. The 
proper price, according to the challengers, would be the wholesale price 
(“LMP”) minus the retail cost of the electricity (“G”). An amicus brief from 
economist Robert Borlick and several others supported this conclusion,7 as did 
comments filed during the rulemaking process by economist William Hogan.8   
How is a court to weigh in on this debate? Answer: very carefully. The Su-
preme Court ultimately sided with FERC, applying a set of overlapping 
deference doctrines and concluding that the pricing scheme was a reasonable 
exercise of FERC discretion. The ensuing sections take a closer look at how 
these deference doctrines operate in the energy law context. Part I suggests that 
the Court’s deferential approach to arbitrary and capricious review in EPSA is 
consistent with a new theory of “thin” rationality review articulated by Jacob 
Gersen and Adrian Vermeule.9 Part II notes that energy decisions have tradi-
tionally received an extra layer of deference (what Emily Hammond has called, 
in another context, “super deference”10), and that EPSA is faithful to that 
approach. Finally, Part III offers insights into how both “thin” rationality 
review and “super deference” operate in practice. While some judges and 
Justices are more willing than others to educate themselves about energy policy, 
all rely to some extent on “deference proxies” in reviewing FERC’s decisions. 
These proxies—which include procedural regularity, expert support, and the 
presence or absence of a dissenting decisionmaker—can be used to confirm a 
																																																								
5 Id. paras. 50–54. 
6 Id. para. 20. 
7 See generally Brief for Robert L. Borlick et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, FERC v. 
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840, 14-841). 
8 See generally Dr. William W. Hogan, Providing Incentives for Efficient Demand Response, 
Comments on PJM Demand Response Proposals (Oct. 29, 2009). 
9 See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2016). 
10 Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as 
Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011). 
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judge’s intuitions about agency rationality. As this case demonstrates, however, 
proxies are an imperfect assessment tool and can be used selectively to support 
divergent outcomes.  
 
I. “THINNER” RATIONALITY REVIEW 
 
Courts review a significant fraction of agency action, including most rule-
makings, under the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard. This standard, originally thought of as similar to constitu-
tional rationality review,11 requires reviewing courts to set aside agency action 
that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law.”12 In a set of decisions in the 1970s and ‘80s, the Supreme Court 
appeared to interpret this standard to require a more searching inquiry into 
agency decisionmaking. 13 The traditional formulation of this “harder look” 
requires courts to satisfy themselves that the agency has considered the relevant 
factors and that there is a “rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.”14 However, the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court remain 
significantly more likely to defer to agency action under this standard than to 
overturn it.15 
In a recent article, Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule offer a series of 
novel arguments in defense of a “thin” conception of rationality review. Thin-
ner review is desirable, they argue, because even rational agencies sometimes 
“have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, non-rational, or 
arbitrary.”16 For example, agencies might have to select between equally plausi-
ble alternatives in the presence of genuine “Knightian” uncertainty (where 
insufficient information exists even to assign likelihoods to possible states of 
the world).17 There might also be good second-order reasons for making a 
decision that is “good enough” but not perfect (“satisficing”), for instance where 
																																																								
11 Gillian Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 479, 491 (2010). 
12 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
13 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
14 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962)). 
15 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1; David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 
169 (suggesting that agencies win nearly 70% of cases in the courts of appeals regardless of the 
standard of review employed). 
16 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 2. 
17 Id. at 26. 
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information gathering is costly or where there are opportunity costs associated 
with more deliberate action.18 Deference might even be justified, Gersen and 
Vermeule conclude, where an agency fails to communicate convincing reasons 
for its decision. This is so since agencies might be relying on “tacit expertise”—
Hayekian local knowledge that cannot be communicated to courts at acceptable 
cost.19 
EPSA provides yet another data point in support of Gersen and Ver-
meule’s descriptive thesis that arbitrary and capricious review in the Supreme 
Court is quite deferential. The Court in EPSA declined to “ask whether a 
regulatory decision is the best one possible or even whether it is better than the 
alternatives.”20 Rather, it found that its task was simply to review the agency’s 
decision under the “narrow” standard of State Farm, 21 asking whether the 
agency “examine[d] the relevant [considerations] and articulate[d] a satisfactory 
explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made.”22 In other words, the Court accepted that the 
agency could engage in what Gersen and Vermeule call “satisficing”: selecting a 
“good enough” alternative rather than exhausting time and resources in pursuit 
of a single “best” choice.  
The decision also offers support for Gersen and Vermeule’s argument that 
an agency’s “local knowledge” may sometimes justify its choice, even though 
this type of specialized information may be costly to communicate effectively to 
a reviewing court. In Order 745, FERC noted that “the Commission is not 
limited to textbook economic analysis of the markets subject to our jurisdiction, 
but also may account for the practical realities of how those markets operate.”23 
Here, FERC knew from its experience observing wholesale market dynamics 
over a course of years and from its repeated interactions with relevant stake-
holders that setting the price for demand response any lower than LMP would 
fail to overcome existing barriers to demand response participation in wholesale 
markets.24 Even if FERC failed to articulate precisely how that experience 




18 Id. at 30. 
19 Id. at 36–37. 
20 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016). 
21 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
22 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43) (alterations in original). 
23 Order 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 para. 46. 
24 See id. paras. 59–61. 
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II. ENERGY “SUPER DEFERENCE” 
 
Certain agency actions qualify for even greater deference than that typically 
afforded under the arbitrary and capricious standard. This is because complexi-
ty also impacts the “thickness” of a court’s deference regime. Reviewing courts 
are to be at their “most deferential” in reviewing agency determinations “within 
[the agency’s] area of special expertise,” especially those “at the frontiers of 
science.”25 Broad deference is also appropriate where an agency program is 
“technical” and “complex.”26 Emily Hammond has termed this special solici-
tude for scientific or technical agency decisionmaking “super deference.”27    
Many aspects of energy decisionmaking have qualified for a heightened 
level of deference, including ratemaking and the evaluation of complex market 
conditions.28 The Supreme Court has suggested that increased deference is due 
more generally to an energy agency simply because its decisionmaking takes 
place in the context of a complex regulatory regime.29 In another case, the 
Court premised enhanced deference on the fact that certain FERC statutory 
authorizations are “incapable of precise judicial definition.”30 
The majority’s articulation of the deference due to the Commission in 
EPSA is consistent with general principles of “super deference”: “[W]e afford 
great deference to the Commission in its rate decisions,”31 Justice Kagan wrote 
for the majority, later noting that “[t]he disputed question here involves both 
technical understanding and policy judgment.”32 In his dissent below, Judge 
Edwards framed the principle of deference in similar terms, finding that 
“[w]e . . . afford significant deference to FERC in light of the highly technical 
																																																								
25 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
26 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (applying Auer deference, rather 
than the arbitrary and capricious standard). 
27See generally Hammond Meazell, supra note 10.  
28 See, e.g., Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 541–42 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“This 
court properly defers to policy determinations invoking the Commission’s expertise in evaluating 
complex market conditions.” (quoting Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 400 F.3d 23, 27 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005))); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. FERC, 922 F.2d 865, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(“[O]ur traditional duty to defer can only be enhanced in the present situation by the complexity 
and technical nature of the ratemaking process.”).  
29 See California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 (1990) (discussing the interpretation of a section of 
the Federal Power Act). 
30 Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 
532 (2008) (discussing the Federal Power Act’s requirement that rates be “just and reasonable”).  
31 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (quoting Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 532) 
(alteration in original). 
32 Id. at 784. 
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regulatory landscape that is its purview.”33 Perhaps Justice Sotomayor put it 
best at oral argument when she asked, with respect to the pricing question, 
“[H]ow do we choose to go into the weeds of something as technical as that?”34 
Notwithstanding Justice Sotomayor’s cautionary statement about delving 
too deeply into a technical area, many judges do appear more comfortable with 
complex subject matter. To be sure, some investigation of substance is unavoid-
able. Deference, after all, does not mean abdication. Judges must still assure 
themselves that the agency’s choice satisfies some threshold level of rationality. 
At a minimum, this requires judges to attain sufficient comfort with the subject 
matter to comprehend the agency’s choice and its reasoning.  
Some judges, however, evince a particularly keen desire to understand the 
landscape before them, regardless of (or perhaps due to) its complexity. These 
judges engage in a process of exploration and distillation. Justice Kagan’s 
majority opinion and Judge Edwards’s dissent in the D.C. Circuit both exhibit-
ed a thirst for understanding absent from Judge Brown’s majority opinion 
below. For example, while Justice Kagan engaged in a meticulous and thorough 
exposition of the major support for FERC’s pricing scheme,35 Judge Brown 
failed to engage with the particulars of FERC’s choice, citing an unwillingness 
to “delve now into the dispute among experts” and noting only that aspects of 
the decision “seem[] troubling . . . .”36 Even at oral argument it was clear that 
some Justices had a greater appetite for detail than others. Justice Breyer, for 
example, assured counsel for the respondents that he would “read Kahn’s 
testimony, I promise. I will read Cicchetti, and I will read Hogan too.”37 While 
a genuine understanding of the underlying technical and economic principles 
may not be required under a highly deferential standard of review, it makes 
judges more comfortable with their reasonableness findings. It is to this ten-
sion—between the judicial instinct to make well-informed, “correct” decisions, 
on the one hand, and the institutional obligation to defer, in certain circum-
stances, to agency decisions, on the other—that the next section turns. 
 
																																																								
33 EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
34 Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840). 
35 See EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782–84. 
36 EPSA, 753 F.3d at 225. 
37 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 53. 
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III. TRUST, BUT VERIFY 
 
EPSA therefore stands for the proposition, first, that the Supreme Court 
applies a “thin” version of rationality review to agency action and, second, that 
the Court shows even greater deference to many FERC decisions because their 
subject matter is technical and complex. But the opinion also yields insights 
about how both “thin” rationality review and “super deference” operate in 
practice.   
In both cases, judges rely on what I call “deference proxies” to confirm 
their generalist instincts. This process might best be described by the phrase 
“trust, but verify,” an old Russian proverb popularized by President Reagan in 
describing the United States’ approach to international arms control regimes.38 
Proxies give the judge greater confidence in the agency’s approach without 
requiring a full understanding of the underlying subject matter.  
Procedural safeguards are classic proxies used to evaluate the substantive 
rationality of agency action.39 This approach has clear institutional advantages 
in that it saves generalist judges from having to opine on substantive issues 
outside of their comfort zone while allowing them to focus on one of their areas 
of expertise: procedure. In EPSA, Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, as well as 
the two opinions below, all relied to some extent on this technique. Justice 
Kagan, for example, noted that FERC “responded at length to EPSA’s” argu-
ment that LMP overcompensated demand response providers.40 The very act of 
responding, and especially doing so “at length,” seems to be a significant 
indicator of rationality, even before considering the content of that response. 
Proxies might also include the presence or absence of expert opinions sanc-
tioning the agency’s approach. These expert opinions might be part of the 
record below, or they might appear in amicus briefs.41 In EPSA, Justice Kagan 
noted FERC’s reliance “on an eminent regulatory economist’s views” in arriving 
																																																								
38 See, e.g., Nina Porzucki, Suzanne Massie Taught President Ronald Reagan This Important 
Russian Phrase: ‘Trust, but Verify’, PUBLIC RADIO INT’L (Mar. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/BR7V-
VG72. 
39 See e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 
181 (identifying both substantive and procedural components of arbitrary and capricious review); 
Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L. REV. 721, 767 
(2014) (noting that judges can review an agency’s procedures for gathering technical or scientific 
“inputs” even if they are ill-qualified to review the inputs themselves). 
40 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 783. 
41 While judges must focus only on an agency’s contemporaneous explanations for its actions in 
evaluating rationality, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943), post hoc explanations 
can give the judge more comfort with the agency’s approach. 
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at its conclusions.42 The opinion cited repeatedly to Dr. Alfred Kahn’s affida-
vit.43 Of course, the other side produced an army of economists disputing Dr. 
Kahn’s approach, including one responsible for the independent monitoring of 
PJM, the regional transmission organization with the most practical demand 
response experience to date.44  And in fact, Justice Scalia’s dissent, though 
professing “neither need nor desire” to address the pricing issue, hinted that he 
would have found FERC’s price arbitrary and capricious based on the amicus 
brief of economist and management consultant Robert Borlick.45  
Finally, judges sometimes use an absence of unanimity at the agency as a 
proxy for irrationality. This proxy cuts in the other direction—the presence of 
one or more dissenting views on the Commission can be seen as reason to 
doubt the rationality of the majority’s decision. Judge Brown’s majority opinion 
in the D.C. Circuit emphasized the existence of a dissenting view on the 
Commission: the opinion cited to Commissioner Moeller’s dissent in support 
of its conclusion that FERC’s pricing scheme was arbitrary.46   
The use of proxies is a rational response to both cognitive and institutional 
limitations as well as resource constraints. Judges, too, must “satisfice.” But the 
process has costs as well. First is the peril of “proxy shopping.” Like Justice 
Kagan and Judge Edwards, Judge Brown relied on deference proxies; each 
judge simply selected different proxies. By focusing on one type of proxy (a 
Commissioner’s dissent) to the exclusion of others (the procedural safeguards 
and expert opinions highlighted by Justice Kagan and Judge Edwards), Judge 
Brown reached a very different result. Even where two opinions rely on the 
same type of proxy, they might select versions that point in different directions. 
A good example is Justice Kagan’s reliance on the expert views of Alfred Kahn, 
which supported FERC’s pricing scheme, while Justice Scalia relied on the 
expert opinion of Robert Borlick, which criticized it.  
A second drawback to the use of proxies is that some proxies are inherently 
more reliable than others. A procedural deficiency (such as a failure to respond 
to key comments) may be more likely to indicate a substantive problem with a 
decision than one Commissioner’s dissent (which might be motivated by law, 
policy, or even politics and may be less carefully crafted than the official Com-
mission order). If judges do not reflect carefully on the inherent reliability of 
																																																								
42 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782. 
43 See id. at 769, 782. 
44 Brief for Robert L. Borlick et al., supra note 7. 
45 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 789 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
46 EPSA, 753 F.3d at 225. 
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Energy cases in the Supreme Court are a rarity. Perhaps this explains, in 
part, the Court’s apparent eagerness to consider the pricing issue in EPSA. 
Had it allowed the D.C. Circuit’s ruling on that question to stand, it might 
have been another five or even ten years before the Court could clarify its 
position on deference in energy cases.  
The lessons for FERC are clear: the Supreme Court maintains its deferen-
tial approach to energy decisionmaking in general and to energy ratemaking in 
particular. Some Justices clearly hunger to understand the electricity system and 
electricity policy, and FERC should provide clear explanations of its actions in 
future rulemakings with this audience in mind. However, all judges ultimately 
rely on deference proxies in evaluating agency decisionmaking under deference 
regimes. Thus, at least where there is a significant litigation risk, FERC should 
ensure that as many of these proxy signals as possible support its decision.  
